Accéder directement au contenu Accéder directement à la navigation
Communication dans un congrès

Output Floors

Abstract : We examine various implementation issues and challenges related to the calibration of output floors in setting minimum bank capital requirements under the finalized version of the Basel III capital accord. In our view, the main raison d’être of output floors is to limit the capital savings enjoyed by large banks due to regulatory arbitrage under the internal model paradigm. We consider regulatory arbitrage through the bank’s incentive to optimize its grading system in order to lower as much as possible the capital requirement given the structure of its asset portfolio in terms of internal ratings and default probabilities. Based on a fictional portfolio of French SMEs observed over a full business cycle, we conduct a counterfactual analysis in order to compare the effect of the output floor implemented with respect to various benchmarks: a Basel I-style benchmark and two versions of the revised standardized approach. Our results show that a more risk-sensitive benchmark is likely to reduce the effect of the output floor on the “extra” RWA and, in fine, on the minimum capital requirement. Otherwise stated, the lower the gap between the internally-derived RWA, subject to regulatory capital arbitrage, and its standardized approach yardstick, the higher the probability that the output floor mechanism becomes less binding or even irrelevant.
Keywords : Output Floors Adrian POP University of Nantes (LEMNA) Institute of Banking & Finance Chemin de la Censive du Tertre BP 52231 44322 Nantes Cedex 3 France Tel.: +33-2-40-14-16-54 fax: +33-2-40-14-16-50. E-mail address: adrian.pop@univ-nantes.fr (Corresponding author) Diana POP University of Angers (GRANEM) 13 Allée François Mitterrand BP 13633 49036 Angers Cedex 01 France Tel.: +33-2-41-96-21-24 fax: +33-2-41-96-21-96. E-mail address: diana.pop@univ-angers.fr 22/02/2022 Abstract: We examine various implementation issues and challenges related to the calibration of output floors in setting minimum bank capital requirements under the finalized version of the Basel III capital accord. In our view the main raison d’être of output floors is to limit the capital savings enjoyed by large banks due to regulatory arbitrage under the internal model paradigm. We consider regulatory arbitrage through the bank’s incentive to optimize its grading system in order to lower as much as possible the capital requirement given the structure of its asset portfolio in terms of internal ratings and default probabilities. Based on a fictional portfolio of French SMEs observed over a full business cycle we conduct a counterfactual analysis in order to compare the effect of the output floor implemented with respect to various benchmarks: a Basel I-style benchmark and two versions of the revised standardized approach. Our results show that a more risk-sensitive benchmark is likely to reduce the effect of the output floor on the “extra” RWA and in fine on the minimum capital requirement. Otherwise stated the lower the gap between the internally-derived RWA subject to regulatory capital arbitrage and its standardized approach yardstick the higher the probability that the output floor mechanism becomes less binding or even irrelevant. Keywords: regulatory arbitrage risk weighted assets output floor solvency regulations Basel capital accords internal rating systems standardized approach
Type de document :
Communication dans un congrès
Liste complète des métadonnées

https://hal.univ-angers.fr/hal-03692238
Contributeur : Diana Pop Connectez-vous pour contacter le contributeur
Soumis le : jeudi 9 juin 2022 - 16:06:06
Dernière modification le : jeudi 4 août 2022 - 17:18:34

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-03692238, version 1

Citation

Adrian Pop, Diana Pop. Output Floors. 38th Symposium in Money Banking and Finance, Jun 2022, Strasbourg, France. ⟨hal-03692238⟩

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

7